Urban Survival Planning - More on the Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Threat

If you are a Survivalist and/or a reader of this site and other Survivalist sites, you either have heard about, or have read the Survival novels “Lights Out” and “One Second After”. As I have said many times before, these well written novels, as well as the Survivor classic “Patriots” (and others) serve as a Wargaming and lessons learned experience for those of us planning and preparing for The End Of The World As We Know It (TEOTWAKI) or otherwise known as the Coming Collapse. Since we as Americans have not faced a catastrophic event plunging us into a collapse and therefore widespread Survivalist scenario, we draw possibilities, lessons, techniques and ultimately “wargame” what can happen from the stories of these novels.

As with the story lines in ”Lights Out” and “One Second After”, nuclear devices are detonated creating an Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) across wide portions of the United States, collapsing our delicate financial and communications infrastructure which lead to a collapse of utilities and emergency response infrastructure. I hope this article on EMP from STRATFOR enlightens and educates on the EMP threat. Be Prepared.

Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

Over the past decade there has been an ongoing debate over the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to modern civilization. This debate has been the most heated perhaps in the United States , where the commission appointed by Congress to assess the threat to the United States warned of the dangers posed by EMP in reports released in 2004 and 2008. The commission also called for a national commitment to address the EMP threat by hardening the national infrastructure.

There is little doubt that efforts by the United States to harden infrastructure against EMP — and its ability to manage critical infrastructure manually in the event of an EMP attack — have been eroded in recent decades as the Cold War ended and the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia lessened. This is also true of the U.S. military, which has spent little time contemplating such scenarios in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union . The cost of remedying the situation, especially retrofitting older systems rather than simply regulating that new systems be better hardened, is immense. And as with any issue involving massive amounts of money, the debate over guarding against EMP has become quite politicized in recent years.

We have long avoided writing on this topic for precisely that reason. However, as the debate over the EMP threat has continued, a great deal of discussion about the threat has appeared in the media. Many STRATFOR readers have asked for our take on the threat, and we thought it might be helpful to dispassionately discuss the tactical elements involved in such an attack and the various actors that could conduct one. The following is our assessment of the likelihood of an EMP attack against the United States .

Defining Electromagnetic Pulse

EMP can be generated from natural sources such as lightning or solar storms interacting with the earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic field. It can also be artificially created using a nuclear weapon or a variety of non-nuclear devices. It has long been proven that EMP can disable electronics. Its ability to do so has been demonstrated by solar storms, lightning strikes and atmospheric nuclear explosions before the ban on such tests. The effect has also been recreated by EMP simulators designed to reproduce the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear device and study how the phenomenon impacts various kinds of electrical and electronic devices such as power grids, telecommunications and computer systems, both civilian and military.

The effects of an EMP — both tactical and strategic — have the potential to be quite significant, but they are also quite uncertain. Such widespread effects can be created during a high-altitude nuclear detonation (generally above 30 kilometers, or about 18 miles). This widespread EMP effect is referred to as high-altitude EMP or HEMP. Test data from actual high-altitude nuclear explosions is extremely limited. Only the United States and the Soviet Union conducted atmospheric nuclear tests above 20 kilometers and, combined, they carried out fewer than 20 actual tests.

As late as 1962 — a year before the Partial Test Ban Treaty went into effect, prohibiting its signatories from conducting aboveground test detonations and ending atmospheric tests — scientists were surprised by the HEMP effect. During a July 1962 atmospheric nuclear test called “Starfish Prime,” which took place 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific, electrical and electronic systems were damaged in Hawaii , some 1,400 kilometers away. The Starfish Prime test was not designed to study HEMP, and the effect on Hawaii , which was so far from ground zero, startled U.S. scientists.

High-altitude nuclear testing effectively ended before the parameters and effects of HEMP were well understood. The limited body of knowledge that was gained from these tests remains a highly classified matter in both the United States and Russia. Consequently, it is difficult to speak intelligently about EMP or publicly debate the precise nature of its effects in the open-source arena.

The importance of the EMP threat should not be understated. There is no doubt that the impact of a HEMP attack would be significant. But any actor plotting such an attack would be dealing with immense uncertainties — not only about the ideal altitude at which to detonate the device based on its design and yield in order to maximize its effect but also about the nature of those effects and just how devastating they could be.

Non-nuclear devices that create an EMP-like effect, such as high-power microwave (HPM) devices, have been developed by several countries, including the United States . The most capable of these devices are thought to have significant tactical utility and more powerful variants may be able to achieve effects more than a kilometer away. But at the present time, such weapons do not appear to be able to create an EMP effect large enough to affect a city, much less an entire country. Because of this, we will confine our discussion of the EMP threat to HEMP caused by a nuclear detonation, which also happens to be the most prevalent scenario appearing in the media.

Attack Scenarios

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude. Only the United States , United Kingdom , France , Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.)

The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States.

However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States , and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating.

Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on.

In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

Rogue Actors

One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike.

When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear weapons program. It is also highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and treasure to develop a nuclear weapon would entrust such a weapon to an outside organization. Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted above, a nuclear weapon is seen as a deterrent by countries such as North Korea or Iran , which seek such weapons to protect themselves from invasion, not to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that other groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a counterstrike and would therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to it.

Also, such a scenario would require not a crude nuclear device but a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead. The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that required to construct a crude device. A warhead must be far more compact than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics and physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy and explosives technology, and overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our estimation that it would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely.

But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile it was not designed for and then getting it to launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance. Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship using an improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology, which uses volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)

Such a scenario is challenging enough, even before the uncertainty of achieving the desired HEMP effect is taken into account. This is just the kind of complexity and uncertainty that well-trained terrorist operatives seek to avoid in an operation. Besides, a ground-level nuclear detonation in a city such as New York or Washington would be more likely to cause the type of terror, death and physical destruction that is sought in a terrorist attack than could be achieved by generally non-lethal EMP.

Make no mistake: EMP is real. Modern civilization depends heavily on electronics and the electrical grid for a wide range of vital functions, and this is truer in the United States than in most other countries. Because of this, a HEMP attack or a substantial geomagnetic storm could have a dramatic impact on modern life in the affected area. However, as we’ve discussed, the EMP threat has been around for more than half a century and there are a number of technical and practical variables that make a HEMP attack using a nuclear warhead highly unlikely.

When considering the EMP threat, it is important to recognize that it exists amid a myriad other threats, including related threats such as nuclear warfare and targeted, small-scale HPM attacks. They also include threats posed by conventional warfare and conventional weapons such as man-portable air-defense systems, terrorism, cyberwarfare attacks against critical infrastructure, chemical and biological attacks — even natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tsunamis.

The world is a dangerous place, full of potential threats. Some things are more likely to occur than others, and there is only a limited amount of funding to monitor, harden against, and try to prevent, prepare for and manage them all. When one attempts to defend against everything, the practical result is that one defends against nothing. Clear-sighted, well-grounded and rational prioritization of threats is essential to the effective defense of the homeland.

Hardening national infrastructure against EMP and HPM is undoubtedly important, and there are very real weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in America ’s critical infrastructure — not to mention civil society. But each dollar spent on these efforts must be balanced against a dollar not spent on, for example, port security, which we believe is a far more likely and far more consequential vector for nuclear attack by a rogue state or non-state actor.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR. http://www.stratfor.com

Urban Survival Firearms - Survival Firearms Battery Comments

UrbanSurvivalSkills.com received a question on handguns and rifles to outfit a Urban Survival Group. “I have been preparing to survive a collapse for a few years now. Been buying dehydrated and other food, stocking rice, beans, pasta and such. I have a location that my family and I can bug out to with I am forced to leave my house. This location has year round water and a liveable house about 6 miles away from the nearest State or County road. My question is on guns suitable for Survival. I have several 12 gauge hunting shotguns, a .30-06 bolt action rifle, a .243 bolt action rifle, an M1 Garand, a .22 LR semi-automatic handgun and a .44 magnum revolver of all things. My son can handle all these guns, but everything except the .22 LR handgun are too much for my wife and two younger daughters. I am thinking about buying some additional .22 LR handguns so at least the girls can be armed. What do you think?”

UrbanMan replies: I think you got the right idea on being able to arm everyone. You never know when your family (Survival Group) can be separated. However, being armed with only a .22 LR handgun is just a step above a pitchfork, unless the user is very skilled and has plenty of ammunition, then a .22 LR pistol is just above a Samurai Sword. Okay, come on, a little humor appreciation is requested here.

Handguns are defensive weapons and marginal for protection,……being the choice when a rifle or shotgun is unavailable. You didn’t mention the ages of your daughters, but I’ll just bet if they are old enough to consider arming with a .22 LR handgun, then they are old enough to be trained to handle and shoot something in a better caliber. Handgun caliber carbines would be very easy to handle in 9x19mm or .40 S&W. Although I would have a hard time carrying a long gun in a pistol caliber when carbine and rifle calibers are available in the same size. I would consider a rifle/carbine in .223 Remington such as an AR platform (AR-15, M-4 variant or Ruger Mini-14),….even an M-1 carbine would be a step up.

I know a man in Northern Arizona , who Survival Firearms Battery consists of Mini-14’s for him and his son, and M-1 carbine for his wife and one teen-age daughter, plus 9x19mm handguns for all and a couple 12 gauge shotguns. This guy is well north of the Interstate Highway and very rarely sees undocumented (illegal) aliens.

If AR’s, Mini-14’s or M-1 carbines don’t work for you, because of cost or whatever, and you want to stick to the .22 LR caliber, then I consider arming my females with both handguns and rifles.

You may be able to borrow several different types of guns for your girls to shoot,..lever actions; magazine fed center fire pistol caliber carbines; .38 Special /.357 Magnum revolvers, and others. The females have go to be able to operate the gun and be comfortable with it, so this try before you buy concept have pay off for you.

Good luck to you. With your current Survival Firearms Battery you are off to a good start and better armed than a lot of people. I think you are on the right track wanting to arm everyone in your small family (Survival Group), just consider the reliability for the guns you choose both in function and capability to stop a bad guy; consider training a very necessary step for all your family members.

Urban Survival Firearms - Lever Guns better than AR's?

UrbanSurvivalSkills.com received this comment from Outlander777....."I agree with most of all said here except I would point novice weapons owners to another system then an AR. It is not the end all system and does require more then a basis knowledge to opperate at max performance levels. Lever actions like the BLR 81 have magazines, Marlin lever actions carry 8 to 10 rounds. It is important not to go out as an aggressor force. Avoid all fights as much as possible, there wont be a lot of medical to be had in the TEOTWAWKI world."

UrbanMan replies: I agree with the concept of novices having simple firearms to operate. Any firearms needs, of course, to be reliable as well. However, I think I would train a novice to operate an M-4 variant as easily as I could a lever gun. I used both all my life and carried guns for a living the past 33 years. I would love to be able to carry a big bore lever gun - just like the style - but in a collapse the advantages of weapons that do not have to be re-loaded so often, and has less felt recoil is a good thing. Box magazines lever guns are an easier gun to reload than the traditional side loading, tubular magazine lever guns, and if I relied on a magazine fed, lever gun, I would have a dozen or more spare magazines for it.

The Mini-14 is a really good little .223, just with a bad rap due to it's mediocre sights. Replace the sights and you have a very reliable magazine fed gun, easily to learn and shoot. The M-1 carbine is the same albeit with a much more anemic round at a 110 grain round nose metal case bullet going a nominal 1,800 feet per second. Although I have one of those also. It's a back up gun and intended to be issued to any new people in my survival group that are firearms novices or otherwise incapable of handling larger firearms.

I agree with the concept of not being an aggressor until you have to be. Sometimes it would be necessary to take a fight to someone or some group as opposed to having the fight at your home or Survival site. In any event, have the fight on your terms and those terms should be favorable to you, whether you are fighting from prepared defensive positions at your home or Survival Site, or initiating an ambush on a mob obviously heading towards your home and therefore your family.

I also agree that the probability of no medical care in a TEOTWAWKI world, hence ever scrap, scratch and cut gets maximum treatment. I have seen small mesquite needle puncturesgo without treatment and create bad infections in hands and arms.

Outlander 777 thanks for the input and back and forth...you sound like you know your guns - the BLR 81 is an excellent rifle. Be safe.

Urban Survival Planning - Primer on Pandemics

Given the unpredictable behavior of influenza viruses and other diseases, neither the timing nor the severity of the next pandemic can be predicted with any certainty. In detecting a new pandemic virus, continuous global surveillance of influenza and diseases are key to the early detection of a virus with pandemic potential and the protection protocols Urban Survivalists will need to take.

There is a network of more than 120 National Influenza Centres in over 90 countries that monitor disease and influenza activity and isolate viruses in every region of the world. National Influenza and Communicable Disease Control Centers report the detection of an “unusual” viruses immediately to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza and Disease Control Programs and one of the five WHO Collaborating Centers. Rapid detection of unusual virus outbreaks, isolation of viruses with pandemic potential and immediate alert to WHO by national authorities is critical to a timely and efficient response.

After the scares of the H1NI and H5N1 virus this past year, which turned out to be much ado about nothing, many people think the threat is minimal. This does not mean we can dismiss this threat. We have just not seen the radically mutated viruses that we have seen in the past century. But we have also seen over and over the in-ability of the Government to respond quickly and effectively. And given the Government's vast resources and communications capability you would think it would be better. This just means that we have to responsible for our own protection. And that begins with information.

We need to be able to identify the threats and keep visibility on the spread of the viruses, symptoms and recommended Rx treatment plans, and to collate that information into your Survival Plan, be it a Bug Out Plan and/or protocols for contact with other people outside of our Survival Group. Remember, that operations planned in an information/intelligence vaccuum have a much lower chance of success.

Urban Survialists must also have the ability to protect themselves from potential pandemic threats, using sepearation from potential threats; disinfecting, sterilization, treatment and even quarantining protocols. With the community and national medical response capability tanking after a sudden collapse, disease will be rampant. Escalated by the probable mobility of large groups of people seeking safety, food and water,...the chances of an Urban Survival Group encountering infected people will be great.

As the Pandemic situation unfolds either as a catalyst for a collapse or certainly becoming a fact after a sudden economic collapse and resulting anarchy, the Suvivalist needs to understand the Medical and Health doctrine for Pandemics in order to parlay that information into the courses of action for otheir Survival Plans. When you are watching or listing to Public Service announcements via the TV or radio, or getting your information via the shortwave, be aware of the Pandemic Phases descriptions:

Phase 1 no viruses circulating among animals have been reported to cause infections in humans.

In Phase 2 an animal influenza virus circulating among domesticated or wild animals is known to have caused infection in humans, and is therefore considered a potential pandemic threat.

In Phase 3, an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community level outbreaks. Limited human-to-human transmission may occur under some circumstances, for example, when there is close contact between an infected person and an unprotected caregiver. However, limited transmission under such restricted circumstances does not indicate that
the virus has gained the level of transmissibility among humans necessary to cause a pandemic.

Phase 4 is characterized by verified human-to-human transmission of an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to cause “community-level outbreaks.” The ability to cause sustained disease outbreaks in a community marks a significant upwards shift in the risk for a pandemic. Any country that suspects or has verified such an event should urgently consult with WHO so that the situation can be jointly assessed and a decision made by the affected country if implementation of a rapid pandemic containment operation is warranted. Phase 4 indicates a significant increase in risk of a pandemic but does not necessarily mean that a pandemic is a forgone conclusion.

Phase 5 is characterized by human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two countries in one WHO region. While most countries will not be affected at this stage, the declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to finalize the organization,
communication, and implementation of the planned mitigation measures is short.

Phase 6, the pandemic phase, is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way. During the post-peak period, pandemic disease levels in most countries with adequate surveillance will have dropped below peak observed levels. The post-peak period signifies that pandemic activity appears to be decreasing; however, it is uncertain if additional waves will occur and countries will need to be prepared for a second wave.

Previous pandemics have been characterized by waves of activity spread over months. Once the level of disease activity drops, a critical communications task will be to balance this information with the
possibility of another wave. Pandemic waves can be separated by months and an immediate “at-ease” signal may be premature.

In the post-pandemic period, influenza disease activity will have returned to levels normally seen for seasonal influenza. It is expected that the pandemic virus will behave as a seasonal influenza A virus. At this stage, it is important to maintain surveillance and update pandemic preparedness and response plans accordingly. An intensive phase of recovery and evaluation may be required.